Submitted on November 22nd, 2022 as my course paper for HI367: History of Imperial and Soviet Russia.

Peter the First, Tsar of Russia, living from 1672 to 1725, numbers among the few of our species who have been honored with the legendary agnomen, “the Great.” Written in Russian as Pyotr Velikiy, this name cements his legacy in the ears of modern historians as one of the quintessential absolute monarchs of the early modern era. In modern historiography, it is popular, as L. Jay Oliva writes, to imagine that “Muscovy [Russia] before 1682 was dark and stagnant, that beneath the fearsome winters deep in the forests on the northern reaches of the Volga, Muscovy wallowed in barbarism, superstition, cruelty, and violence,”[1] which was then rescued by Peter during his enlightened reign to become the modern world power it is today. How accurate is this assessment? Was Peter the Great truly that great? How exactly did Peter the Great embrace enlightened absolutism during his reign and why were his efforts more effective in some policy aims and less in others? Oliva doesn’t think this dark-age-to-enlightenment Petrine redemption story is quite accurate, writing, “Such a view is dramatically appealing and still popularly widespread, but is untrue. Muscovy was most certainly in movement when Peter came to direct its destiny and the forms and the directions of that movement certainly shaped the pattern of the Petrine reforms.”[2] However, without Peter’s reforms and policies, the groundwork for the transformation of Russia into a modern enlightenment empire would not have been laid. His enlightenment reforms were successful in that they brought Russia closer to Europe in religion, culture, governance, and economics, which at the turn of the 18^th century was a groundbreaking transformation of the state which only a century earlier had been a failed state.

To Oliva’s point, Peter certainly did not lay the groundwork for absolute rule himself. Oliva states, “[Before Peter] [t]he Tsardom was the unchallenged center of all executive, legislative and judicial authority, although those functions were still crudely organized and performed.”[3] Peter’s greatness comes from the fact that he took the office of the Tsar and made it into a consequential seat, from which he was able to direct the Russian Enlightenment.

            In order to appreciate the significance of Peter’s reign, one must appreciate how uniquely Petrine it was. Before Peter, the Tsar was an autocrat, but possessed very little in the way of concrete, hard power. The common word to describe the Russian state before Peter is ‘backwards.’ Peter actively fought this backwardness his whole reign and it consumed his efforts. Ian Grey writes, “His struggle was all the more difficult because Muscovy was sunk in lethargy; the people were lazy, ignorant, and conservative, and, encouraged by the church, they clung tenaciously to their way of life. But Peter wielded the power of the supreme autocrat and he wielded it ruthlessly. He was also helped by the gradual intrusion of the Western influence. But most important of all in this struggle was the elemental force of his own will, energy, and dedication by which he was to transform Muscovy into the Russian Empire.”[4] The difference between Peter and his predecessors comes down to his adoption of the enlightened absolutist mindset—that he was to hold absolute power by the grace of God, and that he would use it to modernize and advance his country into the next century whether his people wanted it or not.

Peter’s energy needed a body in which to manifest. He began with what was, according to Montesquieu, a surefire way to achieve efficient government and social order—a bureaucracy.[5] Oliva observes, “One of the most important tasks in the building of the centralized absolute monarchies of early modern Europe was the staffing of their bureaucracies. A ruler by the grace of God, armies, or Hobbesian necessity, was still but a single man initiating and then struggling with even larger and more complex tasks. It was soon apparent to such monarchs that they were really no more powerful and successful than their civil servants were talented, efficient, dedicated, disciplines, and increased in numbers.”[6] Peter was the first Tsar to recognize, along with his European counterparts, that a bureaucracy was essential to effective rule. Without a loyal and efficient bureaucracy to carry out his vision, all his work would be for naught. Along with his bureaucracy, and analogous to the enlightenment principle of the rule of law, Peter instituted a robust legal code. Peter’s laws were comprehensive and specific, playing an important role in ensuring his vision was carried out into action. A notable statute of Peter’s was his regulation on the evenness of tombstones in church cemeteries.[7] To Peter, nothing was too specific to be regulated, as he desired his state apparatus to function autonomously while away on war campaigns or consumed with other affairs.

The primary failing of Peter in reforming his own government was at the provincial level.[8] The nobility was too strong and the feudal system was too firmly entrenched for Peter to have much of an impact on the daily lives of most of his subjects. Peter knew he could effect change on the higher levels of society, however, and pursued this vigorously. The legacy of these changes is mixed, and the central government was still not as efficient or orderly as Peter might have liked, but what is significant is the momentum that Peter created for the future of the Russian state’s capacity to enact its will.[9]

Peter’s next task after establishing the arm of his power was to gain control of the conservatives who would oppose his enlightenment efforts. The Russian nobility was less of a direct obstacle to absolute rule than it was a persistent thorn in the side of Peter. It was disorganized and lacking structure but held strong cultural influence nonetheless.[10] Where structure lacked, Peter took advantage and shaped his new nobility in his own image. Peter established a Table of Ranks, which was a new meritocratic system whereby those who served Peter best and were most loyal would be promoted, while those nobles who acted against Peter would have their influence stripped.[11] This new system, while certainly meritocratic and enlightened on the surface, was also incredibly useful in cementing Peter’s influence among the upper levels of Russian society. This is not to suggest that the Table of Ranks was simply a power grab—Peter truly believed in meritocracy and valued it for its own good, in addition to its political advantages. Peter was committed to his new system of civil service and would not allow those with more money or pedigree to buy or inherit their ranks—they had to be earned through faithful service.[12]

Another institution which provided as much an obstacle to the Tsar’s power as the nobility was the Orthodox Church. Peter viewed the Church more as a political entity than a spiritual entity, and thus it needed to have its power subordinated for Peter to reign as an absolutist.[13] Peter suspected the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church of aspiring to hold more power than the Tsar, so he quickly took steps to curtail the Patriarch’s and Church’s influence.[14] Peter established a series of colleges and a Holy Synod which would govern the church in a more protestant style, diminishing the role that the established priestly class had in governance.[15] More significantly, Peter essentially eliminated the position of Patriarch, an arrangement that would remain in place until 1917.[16] As far as curtailing the power of the Church to the state went, Peter was incredibly successful. However, the Church in Russia was more than just its governance structure.

The Church as an organization held power in its own right at the higher levels of society, but to the common folk, Orthodoxy was just as much a cultural practice as it was religious. The Russian people were married to their customs, many of which initially sprung from Orthodoxy but became essential parts of secular Russianness. One of these sacred practices was the growing of beards. According to Grey, “The beard was a fundamental characteristic of the ancient Eastern faith, and one of the chief outward differences between Latin and Greek churches.”[17] The nobles in court grew beards and were attached to the idea of them, but not as much as the commoners. “The simple people cherished their beards more zealously. To them it was part of their Orthodoxy.”[18] This explains the uproar over Peter’s act of outlawing traditional Russian dress in favor of German or French styles and mandating clean-shaven appearances for men in 1698.[19] What was modernization to Peter was considered an attack on Russian culture by many of his subjects. While nobles expressed their discontent more quietly, Russian peasants frequently revolted during Peter’s reign, though none gained enough momentum to present a real threat to Peter’s power.[20]

Oliva observed, “Peter’s confrontation with the Church, then, was but the surface sign of a vast cultural transformation already underway in Muscovy.”[21] Peter’s opposition to the Church’s counter-enlightenment cultural power was interpreted by many as atheism, as was his toleration of other religions within the Russian Empire.[22] However, this confrontation was more a symbol of the changing culture of Russian society from a backwater to a European power than it was a direct takedown of Orthodoxy itself.

Peter’s success as a reformer of the economy is, in the words of Lindsay Hughes, “more controversial.”[23] One the one hand, Peter made significant contributions to Russian industrial development. Before Peter, Russian industry was nonexistent. The land was rich in natural resources, but poor in those who could exploit them for the advancement of Russia. However, Peter’s military expansions and campaign in Sweden necessitated an industrial state, so Peter delivered. The first iron foundries established by Peter were primarily for the purpose of equipping his army.[24] By the end of Peter’s reign, there were nearly 200 large industrial factories, 69 of which were concerned with metallurgy and 23 with lumber.[25] In Peter’s opinion, only absolutism would allow Peter to tap into the Russian land’s vast natural resources.[26] Peter saw himself as the nurturing patron of Russian economics, including educational treatises in the preambles of new economic decrees.[27] In areas of economic development, he was often actively resisted as the nobility were tied to their feudal-agricultural economic system and saw industrialization as a threat to their way of life.[28]

However, historians argue whether his advances in the economy were significant in their own right or represent simply keeping pace with Europe as the far-away Eastern backwater. Further, the amount of real, meaningful economic change can also be disputed. Peter never paid much attention to agriculture, which was the leading industry and largest source of employment in Russia during his reign.[29] Peter’s efforts with trade and private enterprise may also seem fruitless in the near term, as private enterprise held very little capital and trade, insurance, and banking were conducted by foreigners.[30]

Nevertheless, it cannot be disputed that Peter was an aggressive and motivated reformer, who cast a wide net in hopes of making some impact. Grey writes, “The impetus and initiative behind all these developments came from Peter himself. His people showed little enterprise, and the upper classes had always looked down on trade and industry. But by rewards and persistent propaganda Peter gradually overcame their prejudice.”[31] In areas where there was nothing, Peter created something. Russia now had a fledgling bourgeoisie, something which would be unheard of during the reign of earlier Tsars.[32] The economic momentum conceived through Peter’s energy, momentum, and commitment to the enlightenment, made real by his absolute power, laid the foundations for Russian capitalism and industrial development in the future.

How successful was Peter’s enlightened absolutism? Oliva writes that “the Russian Empire at the end of Peter’s reign was a great European power.”[33] Paul Dukes adds, “to understand fully the achievement of Peter the Great, which is not to be lightly dismissed even if it has been exaggerated, it needs to be appreciated not only in its wider European setting but also in relation to the work of his predecessors and successors.”[34] It seems that on both relative and absolute scales, Peter’s reign advanced the position of Russia and prepared it for a future as a dominant power. The only explanation for why Peter had a different impact than his predecessors is his commitment to enlightened absolutism. It was his energy, his vigor, that led the Russian nation from a backwards backwater state to a burgeoning military and industrial force. Bushkovitch notes, “The Westernization of Russian culture was the most permanent effect of Peter’s reign, and it outlasted almost all of his other achievements.”[35] Peter prepared Russia to engage on level ground with states like Germany and France, which is remarkable given that not a century before Peter’s reign, Muscovy was vulnerable to the incursions of the likes of Mongols, Cossacks, and Turks.

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WORKS CITED

Bushkovitch, Paul. Peter the Great. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001.

Dukes, Paul. The Making of Russian Absolutism 1613-1801. New York, NY: Longman Group Limited, 1982.

Grey, Ian. Peter the Great. Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1960.

Hughes, Lindsey. Peter the Great: A Biography. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002.

Oliva, L. Jay. Russia in the Era of Peter the Great. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969.

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[1] L. Jay Oliva, Russia in the Era of Peter the Great, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), 8.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid, 11.

[4] Ian Grey, Peter the Great (Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1960), 16.

[5] Oliva, Russia in the Era of Peter the Great, 78.

[6] Oliva, Russia in the Era of Peter the Great, 97.

[7] Lindsey Hughes, Peter the Great: A Biography (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 169.

[8] Grey, Peter the Great, 389.

[9] Paul Dukes, The Making of Russian Absolutism 1613-1801 (New York, NY: Longman Group Limited, 1982), 76.

[10] Oliva, Russia in the Era of Peter the Great, 15.

[11] Hughes, Peter the Great, 166-7.

[12] Ibid., 166.

[13] Oliva, Russia in the Era of Peter the Great, 79.

[14] Ibid., 135.

[15] Paul Bushkovitch, Peter the Great (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 151.

[16] Ibid., 213

[17] Grey, Peter the Great, 137.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Oliva, Russia in the Era of Peter the Great, 145.

[20] Dukes, The Making of Russian Absolutism, 83.

[21] Oliva, Russia in the Era of Peter the Great, 133.

[22] Grey, Peter the Great, 396.

[23] Hughes, Peter the Great, 213.

[24] Grey, Peter the Great, 414.

[25] Oliva, Russia in the Era of Peter the Great, 124.

[26] Ibid., 117.

[27] Ibid., 131-132.

[28] Ibid., 117.

[29] Grey, Peter the Great, 416.

[30] Hughes, Peter the Great, 214.

[31] Grey, Peter the Great, 415-416.

[32] Dukes, The Making of Russian Absolutism, 78.

[33] Oliva, Russia in the Era of Peter the Great, 172.

[34] Dukes, The Making of Russian Absolutism, 99.

[35] Bushkovitch, Peter the Great, 47.